Continuing Representation Doctrine Does Not Toll the Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Claim, Rules of NH Superior Court

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

In Copeland v. McKittrick Law Offices, decided April 30, 2013, a New Hampshire Superior Court judge dismissed claims against an attorney as barred by the statute of limitations, rejecting the Plaintiff’s argument the continuing representation doctrine applied.
 
The underlying case involved the attorney’s representation of a state employee injured in a motor vehicle accident during the course of his employment.  At issue was the attorney’s alleged failure to properly advise his client regarding obtaining a waiver of the State’s workers’ compensation lien, which totaled $127,000, prior to settling the third party action.  Efforts to obtain a lien waiver after the settlement were unsuccessful and the client sued.

The New Hampshire Superior Court judge granted a motion to dismiss for failure to bring the claim within the three-year statute of limitations.  The Court held the harm arose, at the latest, when the Plaintiff signed the underlying settlement agreement, not when the lien waiver claim ultimately was rejected.  The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the continuing representation doctrine should toll the statute of limitations.  Although the attorney’s representation continued after the settlement, the Court found the Plaintiff could not prove reasonable “innocent reliance” where the record demonstrated the Plaintiff was told by others the lien waiver should have been sought prior to settlement and he testified at his deposition that he questioned the attorney’s approach at the time the matter was settled.

For information on professional liability legal issues, contact Attorney Bill Saturley at 603.410.1500, or learn more at Preti Flaherty’s Professional Services Practice Group page.

Contractor and Designer Tips to Improve Chances of Getting Paid

Friday, May 3, 2013

Engineering News Record (ENR) recently featured an article in its Viewpoint section authored by Preti Flaherty attorney Kenneth E. Rubinstein and Shawmut Design & Construction Chief Legal Officer, Doug Lareau focusing on strategies that contractors and designers can use to improve their chances of getting paid.  A copy of this article can be found here.

Change in Massachusetts Rule on Fee Agreements Illustrates Risk of Cross-Border Practice

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

With the increasing regionalization and consolidation of business clients everywhere, lawyers trying to best service those clients are tempted to practice in multiple jurisdictions at one time.  This complicates the process of maintaining one's professionalism standards, as we try to comply with the demands of more than one state.

Despite the many similarities among the New England states, for example, sometimes the differences can also be significant.  The different approach to fee agreements -- and whether they need to be in writing -- is an example. 

Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts all require that contingent fee agreements be reduced to writing.  (Even in this seeming consensus, there are distinctions:  Massachusetts goes so far, for example, as to specify the number of copies that should exist, and how long the lawyer must maintain his copy.)  As of January 1, 2013, however, Massachusetts has extended the "writing" requirement to nearly all fee agreements.

Maine and New Hampshire continue to recommend that fee agreements be in writing, without requiring it.

The disparity raises questions of conflicts of law.  If one is admitted in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts, for example, and pursuing litigation in Boston for a New Hampshire-based client, which rule applies?  Is there a different answer for a Massachusetts-based client pursuing litigation in Maine? 

As our practices continue to get more complicated, so too, do the rules applying to us.  To learn more, contact a member of Preti Flaherty's Professional Liability Group.

Authored by:  William C. Saturley

REMINDER: A Carrier's Settlement May Not Protect an Agent from Liability

Monday, April 8, 2013


Did you know that under New Hampshire law an insurance agent is not necessarily protected by a legal settlement executed by the agent’s carrier? 
 
In Balamotis v. Hyland, II d/b/a State Farm Agent, 159 N.H. 803 (2010), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that State Farm’s settlement with an Insured over a coverage dispute did not prevent a subsequent suit by the Insured against State Farm’s Agent for failure to procure insurance as instructed by the Insured. 
 
The settlement document at issue did not purport to cover “agents” of State Farm and referred only to its “heirs, administrators, executors, successors, and assigns.”  Accordingly, the later suit against the Agent was not prohibited.  Such a claim against the Agent, the Court held, is separate and distinct from a claim against the Insurer for payment under the policy.
 
If you have questions regarding your rights and risks as an insurance agent, one of our insurance law professionals can advise you.

First Circuit Articulates Strict Standard for Discovery Rule

Monday, April 1, 2013


In a recent opinion (RTR Technologies v. Carlton Helming), the First Circuit upheld a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the accountant, holding the plaintiff’s malpractice claim was time-barred because it was not filed within the three year limitations period as required under Massachusetts law.  In making its ruling, the Court held that the plaintiffs either knew or should have known about their potential claim when they sought a second opinion concerning the advice that they had been given.  The First Circuit articulated a very strict standing, holding that the discovery rule pertains only to those plaintiffs whose injuries are “inherently unknowable.” 

In RTR Technologies v. Carlton Helming, RTR Technologies, a company sued an accountant, who had provided services to the company from 2003 until 2008.  In 2005, the accountant convinced the company to amend the company’s 2002 tax return to re-classify entries on the company’s balance sheets from loans to the principal to income to the principal.  The principal of the company testified she disagreed with the advice, which led her to seek two other expert opinions on the issue, but she nevertheless agreed to the plan and filed the amended return.  A short time after the return was amended, the IRS filed a substantial tax lien against the company.  In 2008, the company hired a new accountant who filed re-amended tax returns for 2002.  The IRS then abated the tax lien.  The plaintiffs sued their previous accountant in Massachusetts state court in the fall of 2009.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the accountant holding the company’s malpractice claim was time-barred because it was not filed within the three year limitations period as required under Massachusetts law.  The company appealed the ruling, arguing the discovery rule should apply.  That rule, under Massachusetts law, holds that a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that she may have been harmed by a defendant’s conduct, even if the harm actually occurred earlier.  The company argued it was not aware of the accountant’s malpractice until 2008.  The First Circuit disagreed and found that the company was aware of both the putative injury (the tax liability) and the putative cause (the accountant’s advice to amend the returns) in 2005, evidenced by the fact the company disagreed with the advice at the time it was received, and had sought other opinions before amending the return in 2005. 

“The law normally ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon perceptible rights,” wrote the First Circuit in the opinion, warning plaintiffs who have constructive knowledge of an actionable legal claim but wait to pursue a cause of action. 
 
Written By: Erin Berry

The Minefield of Threats in Litigation

Monday, March 18, 2013

When negotiating to settle a lawsuit, can a lawyer gain leverage for his client by threatening to report the adversary’s actions to the criminal authorities?  What are the ethical limits on such threats, if any?  Do such threats expose the threatening lawyer to any criminal or tort liability of his own? 

William C. Saturley and Beth Kissinger recently co-wrote an article on these topics, “The Minefield of Threats in Litigation.”  The article was published in the Fall 2012 issue of the New Hampshire Bar Journal. 

The article examines whether threatening criminal prosecution or a report to a regulatory body is just “hard bargaining,” or whether it breaches ethical lines.  The answer varies, even amongst otherwise comparable jurisdictions such as those in the New England region, surprisingly.

The conflict in treatment stems, in part, from each jurisdiction’s adherence to different codifications of ethical standards.  The text of the 1969 version of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, is unequivocal on the subject of threats. DR 7-105(A) provides: “[a] lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain advantage in a civil matter.”  Under the 1983 Model Rules, by contrast, no direct prohibition is found.  Commentary to the Rules suggests that any attempt to improperly employ threats was already prohibited by other provisions of the Model Rules, such as Rule 4.4(a), which prohibits a lawyer from taking any action that “has the primary purpose to embarrass, delay or burden a third person.”

The article also examines possible criminal and tort liability, under New Hampshire law, for the use of such threats. 

The Minefield of Threats in Litigation

Lawyers on the move: steps to take before dancing with a lateral hire

Monday, March 4, 2013


William C. Saturley and Kenneth E. Rubinstein co-wrote a risk management article, “Lawyers on the move: steps to take before dancing with a lateral hire.”  The article suggests actions firms should consider taking prior to hiring a lateral attorney.  While the article is written specifically for law firms, the suggestions are applicable to all professional fields:
●  Verify the apparent skills, and the accuracy of credentials (such as academic history), of the prospective new hire.

●  Research both the disciplinary and malpractice claims history of the individual.
●  Interview others who have personal knowledge of the attorney’s performance.

●  Review recent work product of the prospective hire. (Make sure the work is that of the hire and not a supervised associate).

●  If the lateral is bringing business to the firm, consider potential conflicts of interest with existing clients.  In this regard, a recent change to Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and accompanying commentary, permits limited disclosure by a lawyer about clients he represents to a prospective new hiring firm, without prior client consent. 
●  Consider potential client relation problems (do the fee arrangements with the lateral’s clients conflict with the firm’s standard arrangements?).  Evaluate whether the lateral’s clients appear financially stable.

●  Define the lateral’s staffing expectations.
●  Make sure the firm’s administrative requirements (such as prior engagement letters, or compliance with assignment committee directives) will be adhered to by the lateral.

●  Consider deferring full partnership status to a lateral hire until a reasonable period of time has passed, to allow further evaluation of the candidate; and then closely monitor performance during that period of time.
●  If the firm requires disclosure of income tax returns from its existing partners, consider requesting a return and a personal financial statement from the prospect.

The article was published in the January 2013 issue of the Massachusetts Lawyers Journal, a publication of the Massachusetts Bar Association:  Massachusetts Bar Association : Lawyers on the move: steps to take before dancing with a lateral hire